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WHY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MAY BE EASIER TO
ACHIEVE THAN AN END TO PARTISAN CONFLICT
OVER JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
David S. Law *
Sanford Levinson **
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether the current mode of confirming (or not confirming, as
the case may be) nominees to the federal judiciary constitutes a
"crisis" is certainly debatable.' Fortunately, nothing that we are
about to say depends upon whether the criteria for "crisis" have
in fact been met. It is enough to acknowledge, as other contribu-
tors to this Symposium have demonstrated, that partisan conflict
over judicial appointments, especially to what the Constitution
calls the "inferior" courts'-federal courts of appeals and district
courts-has escalated conspicuously in recent years. It is beyond
argument that Republicans did what they could to torpedo many
of President Clinton's judicial nominations,3 and that Democrats
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junct Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego. B.A., 1993, Stan-
ford University; J.D., 1996, Harvard Law School; M.A., 2000, Stanford University; B.C.L.
in European and Comparative Law, 2003, University of Oxford; Ph.D., 2004, Stanford Uni-
versity. Thanks go to Alex Montgomery and Dawn Johnsen for perceptive suggestions and
criticisms.
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin School of Law; Professor, Department of Government, Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin. B.S., 1962, Duke University; Ph.D., 1969, Harvard University;
J.D., 1973, Stanford University.
1. There is in fact a lower vacancy rate on the federal bench than was true at any
moment during the Clinton presidency. See David G. Savage, Vacancy Rate on Federal
Bench Is at a 13-Year Low, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at A14, discussed in David S. Law,
Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 26
CARDozO L. REV. 479, 527 n.186 (2005).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
3. See John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Ap-
pointments Process Under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1,
14-22 (2003).
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did the same to a number of President Bush's first-term nomi-
nees.4 We see no point in arguing which of the two parties is more
to blame for the current level of conflict; suffice it to say that nei-
ther party is likely to admit responsibility.
There are many ways to torpedo a judicial nomination. The ac-
tual means available to a given party at a particular time depend,
however, on the constellation of political power. Once Republicans
regained control of the Senate in 1994, the Senate Judiciary
Committee could have simply refused to hold hearings and the
like; it was totally unnecessary, for example, for the Republican
majority to filibuster nominations that never escaped committee
in the first place. The same was true when Democrats controlled
the Senate briefly from the summer of 2001 through January of
2003, after Senator Jeffords of Vermont abandoned the Republi-
can Party. Democrats experienced no need to defeat nominees on
the Senate floor, much less to filibuster them, since they could
vote against sending nominations to the full Senate-as in the
case of Charles Pickering-or, had they so chosen, they could
have simply delayed hearings and votes indefinitely. After the
2002 election returned control of the Senate to the Republican
Party, however, the means available to Democrats were consid-
erably reduced. Their efforts as the minority party must now rely
upon the actual or threatened use of the filibuster, by which
forty-one senators can prevent a floor vote on any given nomina-
tion.6 Notwithstanding the losses they suffered in the 2004 elec-
tion, the filibuster remains numerically within their reach.7 For-
tunately for the surviving Democrats, a filibuster-proof Senate
majority remains a rare occurrence-one that has occurred only
three times in the last century.8
4. See id. at 22-27; David G. Savage, Frist Talks Tough on Senate Rules, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2004, at A13.
5. For criticism of the Judiciary Committee's vote against the Pickering nomination,
see 148 CONG. REC. S1915-18 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lott).
6. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the arcane practice of "blue slips,"
by which senators are often able to delay or even preclude full consideration of presiden-
tial nominees. For a discussion of this practice, see Part I.D of Professor Law's article cited
above in note 1.
7. Charles Babington & Mike Allen, Two Issues May Deeply Divide Next Congress;
Parties Are at Odds over High Court, Social Security, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2005, at Al
("But Democrats still hold enough seats to mount filibusters, the delaying strategy that
requires 60 votes to halt.").
8. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 2001-2002, at
56-58 tbls.1-19 (2002); Law, supra note 1, at 515 n.163 and accompanying text.
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If one believes that such resistance to presidential nominations
is a problem-rather than, say, simply American democracy in
action-then the obvious question is whether anything can be
done about it. For purposes of this brief article, we remain agnos-
tic as to whether it even counts as a "problem" (let alone a "cri-
sis"). A number of distinguished judges, including Virginia's J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, testified during the Clinton years that the
Fourth Circuit did not in fact need a full complement of judges.9 If
one believes that Judge Wilkinson was testifying in good faith,
rather than engaging in strategic misrepresentation to try to
head off Democratic dilution of a predominantly conservative
Fourth Circuit, then surely Republicans today must point to what
has changed to make the presence of any unfilled seats a "crisis."
What most interests us, instead, is whether one can expect any
change in the situation in the foreseeable future. To answer this
question requires little explicitly "legal" analysis. Rather, one
must adopt the perspective of political science and ask how it is
that political institutions operate and whether a given status
quo-in this instance, heavily partisan infighting over judicial
appointments-can easily be changed. There is no good reason to
believe that this will occur. And we should state at the outset that
our skepticism has nothing to do with any ill-defined decline in
"civility" or equally ill-defined rise in "partisanship." It is truly
"as pointless as it is popular for commentators to call for civility,
cooperation, and ideological restraint." ° One should not expect
politicians to spend their careers fighting for a policy agenda, only
to allow the appointment of judges who will spend a lifetime on
the bench undermining that agenda, merely because newspaper
editors and law professors have admonished them to play nicely.
Talk is cheap; talk of "civility" and "restraint" especially so.
Ever since John Adams attempted to pack the federal judiciary
with his "midnight judges""-including, most notably and suc-
9. See Sarah Wilson, Appellate Judicial Appointments During the Clinton Presi-
dency: An Inside Perspective, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 29, 37-38 (2003). But see Consid-
ering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-
30 (1997) (statement of Hon. Sam J. Ervin III, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit) (objecting to Judge Wilkinson's proposal to leave Fourth Circuit vacancies unfilled).
10. Law, supra note 1, at 524.
11. See, e.g., Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the His-
tory of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 1753, 1783-84 (2003).
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cessfully, John Marshall as Chief Justice12-appointment to the
federal courts has been correctly perceived as an important presi-
dential concern, for the simple reason that presidents have policy
goals that are better and more enduringly achieved if the bench is
stocked with ideological allies. 13 The fact that the current ap-
pointments impasse concerns "inferior" judges rather than Su-
preme Court nominees is of little surprise, given the obvious con-
temporary importance of the federal courts of appeals. They are
the courts called upon to give concrete meaning to what Anthony
Amsterdam years ago accurately suggested were Delphic pro-
nouncements emanating from the oracles in Washington, 4 and
their efforts remain undisturbed by the Supreme Court 99.7% of
the time. 5
12. See, e.g., id. at 1781.
13. See Law, supra note 1, at Part I.B (discussing Terry Moe's thesis that presidents
seek to have activities critical to successful execution of their policy agenda performed by
like-minded appointees).
14. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Rights of Suspects, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS:
WHAT THEY ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 401-02 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971). It is worth
quoting Amsterdam in extenso:
If we are to believe Par Lagerkvist's The Sibyl, the role of the Pythia, or
priestess of the Oracle at Delphi, was of incomparable grandeur and futility.
This young maiden was periodically lashed to a tripod above a noisome abyss,
wherein her God dwelt and from which nauseating odors rose and assaulted
her. There the God entered her body and soul, so that she thrashed madly
and uttered inspired, incomprehensible cries. The cries were interpreted by
the corps of professional priests of the Oracle, and their interpretations were,
of course, for mere mortals the words of the God.
The Pythia... was viewed with utmost reverence and abhorrence; enor-
mous importance attached to her every utterance; but from the practical
point of view, what she said didn't matter much.
To some extent, this Pythian metaphor describes the Supreme Court's
functioning in all the fields of law with which it deals.
Id. Law professors are unduly impressed-indeed obsessed-by the grandeur and cere-
mony of the Supreme Court. Most Americans are quite properly uninterested in the often
"inspired, incomprehensible cries" delivered by the oracular Court and far more concerned
by what meaning the "priests," the ostensibly "inferior" judges, will give to these utter-
ances. Id. at 402.
15. Professors Songer, Sheehan, and Haire report that, of the nearly 4,000 decisions
rendered by three circuits studied over the course of 1986, only nineteen, or less than half
of one percent, were reviewed by the Supreme Court, and of these, only two-thirds were
reversed, for a net non-reversal rate of 99.7%. See DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 17 (2000).
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Though we academics may refuse them the same cachet, 16 deci-
sions issued in New Orleans, Richmond, Pasadena, Denver, and
other such cities are far more important, practically speaking, to
most Americans than the decisions of the Supreme Court. One
need not denigrate the importance of the Supreme Court in order
to grasp that any politically savvy president would want to estab-
lish control over other federal courts as well. This is especially
true if one also recognizes the many opportunities (and reasons)
that ostensibly "inferior" federal judges have to resist Supreme
Court decisions with which they disagree. 7 The fact that the Su-
preme Court leaves 99.7% of federal appeals court decisions in
place signifies as much the practical inability of the Court to ef-
fectively monitor the decisions of these courts as it does the
Court's pleasure in their handiwork. There are just too many
courts and judges for the nine Justices in Washington, who are
now deciding fewer than 100 cases per year, to reverse every er-
rant decision. Every competent lawyer and all political scientists
know this. So does any president. To expect a president to be sat-
isfied only with the ability to pack a Supreme Court (assuming
Senate cooperation) is equivalent to expecting her to be satisfied
with picking only Cabinet officials and ceding control to her po-
tential adversaries over the appointment of non-civil-service
deputies and assistant secretaries who require Senate confirma-
tion.
Not surprisingly, then, post-Warren Court presidents, begin-
ning with Jimmy Carter, have done what they can to wrest con-
trol over the appointment of circuit judges away from senators of
their own party, who in times past enjoyed considerable authority
over such appointments.18 Carter purported, at least, to be moti-
16. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 126 (1997) (observ-
ing that scholarly emphasis on the Supreme Court has adversely limited attention to other
courts); Martin Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, in MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE
SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION 19-54 (2002) (criticizing scholarly preoccu-
pation with the Supreme Court).
17. In fact, there is much reason to think that the Supreme Court has no choice but to
modify its own doctrine in response to the threat of resistance-a prominent example be-
ing the "all deliberate speed" language of the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). For a rigorous theoretical version of this argument, see
McNollGast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of
Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1641-47 (1995) (arguing that the threat of noncompliance by
lower courts forces the Supreme Court to modify and loosen legal doctrine).
18. See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS 53 (1988); see also SHELDON
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN 236-84 (1997).
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vated by a desire to take the politics out of judicial selection and,
to that end, instituted ostensibly non-partisan commissions who
would recommend candidates19 (though his appointees have
proven more liberal on the whole than those selected by other
Democratic presidents).2" Ronald Reagan, by contrast, was openly
committed to an ideological vision, and his Administration made
no bones about the fact that placing ideological helpmates on the
federal bench was an important part of governance. 21 As judicial
appointments assume increasing importance to the party faithful
and to interest groups alike, there is little reason to think that
presidents are about to lose their interest in the composition of
the federal bench, or that senators of the opposite party will sud-
denly become content simply to rubber-stamp presidential ap-
pointees.
Let us make our point in the most dramatic manner: it is more
plausible to imagine the United States successfully engaging in
nuclear disarmament with Russia (or even the old Soviet Union)
than for presidents and senators of opposing parties to end their
political warfare over judicial nominations. Parts III and IV of
this Article will explain why we believe this to be the case. First,
though, we must indulge ourselves in a brief excursus on nuclear
disarmament.
II. HOW TO ACHIEVE NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION
Imagine two countries, traditional adversaries, each with 1,000
nuclear weapons. Let us also assume that they come to their own
independent conclusions that it would be mutually beneficial to
engage in some measure of disarmament, given both the mainte-
nance costs and the inevitable risks associated with the command
and control of a substantial nuclear arsenal. That is, their desire
to reduce the level of armament is a purely self-interested one,
19. See GOLDMAN, supra note 18, at 260.
20. See, e.g., Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior of President Clinton's Judi-
cial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16, 19-20 (1996) (contrasting the voting records of presi-
dential appointees from Nixon through Clinton).
21. See Law, supra note 1, at Part I.B; see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and
the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional
Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003) (detailing the highly self-conscious articulation within the
Department of Justice of a vision as to how constitutional doctrine should develop, coupled
with the desire to place individuals on the bench who would be sympathetic to such devel-
opments).
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rather than an altruistic desire to benefit one's adversaries or
even, for that matter, simply to make the world safer. As Mae
West might put it, "goodness" or altruism, "[has] nothing to do
with it."
22
All problems of arms reduction and, indeed, cooperation in gen-
eral involve both a bargaining problem and an enforcement prob-
lem.23 The bargaining problem is that of reaching an agreement
beneficial to the parties when each party has an incentive to hold
out for the best possible deal. 24 The enforcement problem is the
one that concerns us here: agreements, once reached, must be
implemented and enforced. Assuming that Countries A and B
solve the bargaining problem and can actually agree to reduce the
level of armament from 1,000 weapons to, say, 250 apiece, it
would not be so difficult for them to implement that agreement,
given certain assumptions.
It is safe to assume that neither country greatly trusts the
other, or else they would not be nuclear rivals. Indeed, blind
trust, whether at the international or interpersonal level, is an
invitation to exploitation. Thus the immortal words of Ronald
Reagan: "Trust, but verify," with all practical emphasis on the
latter.25 Enforcement of any agreement therefore presupposes
22. NIGHT AFTER NIGHT (Universal Studios 1932), quoted in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 685 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
23. See James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52
INT'L ORG. 269, 270 (1998).
24. See id. at 274 (citing watershed works by John Nash and Thomas Schelling) ("[A]
characteristic feature of bargaining problems is that they are dynamic. They are resolved,
if at all, through time, in sequences of offers and counteroffers or with one or both parties
'holding out' in hope that the other will make concessions.").
25. The aptness of the phrase can only be appreciated in context. Reagan himself re-
vealed its origins at a press conference:
Q. Sir, do you trust this opinion of Gorbachev? Do you think he is a man of
peace and that he does want to sincerely reduce weapons, and that a verifi-
able treaty can be reached?
A. As you know, I've had meetings with him, and I do believe that he is faced
with an economic problem in his own country that has been aggravated by
the military buildup, and I believe that he has some pretty practical reasons
for why he would like to see a successful outcome.
Q. Do you trust him?
A. Huh? Do I trust him? Well, he's a personable gentleman, but I cited to him
a Russian proverb-I'm not a linguist, but I at least learned that much Rus-
sian-and I said to him, "Doveryai, no proveryai." It means, "Trust, but ver-
ify."
The President in Venice: Economics, Contra Aid and the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1987,
at A12.
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that each side has sufficiently good intelligence about the other
side's number of weapons so that neither seriously fears, for ex-
ample, that significant numbers of weapons are being hidden
from view.26 So how might the superpowers reduce their own (and
their adversary's) stock of weapons in relatively easy fashion, as-
suming they have each included that it is in their selfish best in-
terest to do so?
One possible, and not unrealistic, answer is that on day one fol-
lowing the signing of the relevant treaty, Country A (decided,
perhaps, by the flip of a coin) destroys one of its missiles in the
presence of officials of the other country. On day two, Country B
destroys two of its missiles under the same conditions; day three
reverts to A, which destroys two of its missiles, and so on for the
relevant number of days necessary to reach the targeted number
of weapons. Note the crucial fact that relatively little time passes
between the actions of each country. This has several desirable
consequences. First, it almost certainly assures that the officials
who negotiated the treaty are in fact responsible for complying
with it. Because their personal reputations are unambiguously at
stake, they have every incentive to show that they are in fact
"trustworthy" by destroying the two missiles required on any
given day. Unexplained failure to comply would surely invite
sharp and immediate criticism in both domestic and diplomatic
arenas. Moreover, and just as important, any reneging will be ob-
vious and subject to immediate retaliation by the other side,
which in this case is the refusal to destroy their own missiles on
the day after the reneging. Game theory teaches us, quite bluntly,
that "[i]f states could instantaneously detect and respond to de-
fection by another state, there would be no short-term gain from
reneging and so no problem of enforcement."27
Perhaps this scheme could operate to reduce each side's weap-
ons arsenal to, say, one hundred or even fifty, depending on the
minimum number of missiles deemed "enough," by relevant au-
thorities, to constitute a credible deterrent-one assumes that no
serious person advocates a nuclear first-strike. However, getting
from fifty to zero, or even to five, might pose much greater diffi-
26. See Fearon, supra note 23, at 290-91 ("If an enforcement problem plagued arms
control in the early Cold War, this probably had to do with monitoring difficulties rather
than a short shadow of the future.").
27. Id. at 278.
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culty. At some point, after all, the marginal value of even one ex-
tra missile might be immense. If so, the temptation to renege
would increase in a drastic and nonlinear way. Even if genuinely
desired by both countries, total disarmament would require ex-
traordinary modes of verification, coupled with a credible threat
of sanctions sufficiently likely and severe to deter cheating. In
any event, it should be clear why it would be so much more diffi-
cult to eliminate the last twenty-five to fifty weapons than the
first thousand. Marginal value, rather than absolute numbers, is
key: as stockpiles approach zero, the increasing marginal value of
a country's remaining missiles and the increasing difficulty of
monitoring compliance combine to make total disarmament an
elusive goal.2"
III. WHAT PRESIDENTS REALLY WANT IN A JUDICIAL NOMINEE
Let us return now to the question posed by this Symposium-
namely, how can partisan warfare over judicial appointments be
reduced? What solution we ought to prefer depends upon what
kind of judges we believe ought to be appointed. The present im-
passe over judicial appointments exists for the most part because
the President has nominated (and renominated29 ) highly conser-
28. One might, of course, object that backwards induction would lead the two coun-
tries not to destroy any of their missiles, even on day one. That is, if Country A knows that
it is going "last" (i.e., it is scheduled to have the last missile-destruction turn), it will be
greatly tempted to cheat in the last round. And Country B knows that Country A faces
this temptation in the last round; therefore, Country B will want to cheat in the next-to-
last round, and so on, until the whole agreement unravels in the very first round. It is true
that, as a theoretical matter, repeat play may not guarantee cooperation if the players can
foresee the end of the game. As a practical matter, however, backwards induction tends
not to preordain failure from the very outset. See JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 156-58 (1994) (describing how people play the "centipede game" in
experimental settings, and noting that uncertainty about the other player's rationality can
break backwards induction). For example, noncompliance is inhibited by the value to each
country of its reputation and the relationship that is created by cooperation. "In the lan-
guage of economics, if the relationship itself is a valuable asset that a party could lose by
dishonest behavior, then the relationship serves as a bond: a [party] would be unwilling to
surrender this bond unless the gain from dishonest behavior was large." Paul R. Milgrom
et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges,
and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 1 (1990). In the present case, as stockpiles
approach zero, the expected gains from noncompliance are likely to outweigh the resulting
losses to reputation and relationship, particularly in light of the increasing difficulty of
detecting noncompliance. Nevertheless, assuming that the two countries are likely to in-
teract again in the future, the value of their relationship may be enough to deter noncom-
pliance in the early rounds.
29. See Michael A. Fletcher & Helen Dewar, Bush Will Renominate 20 Judges, WASH.
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vative figures-more conservative on civil rights issues than
those appointed by Nixon or Reagan, if a recent study is any indi-
cation 3 -and senators have responded by blocking those per-
ceived to be the most extreme.3' One solution, then, is to embrace
the nomination of candidates who hold strong ideological views,
which entails a rejection of the filibuster and other tactics by
which minorities can hold out for the appointment of moderates.
The other solution is to insist upon the nomination of centrists,
which entails some limit upon the ability of presidents to nomi-
nate whomsoever they choose.k
On the one hand, one might not feel that the open clash of op-
posing ideological viewpoints on the bench is a problem in the
first place. One might plausibly think that ideologically commit-
ted judges are in fact good for the federal judiciary, precisely be-
cause they are more willing to challenge conventional wisdom
and call, for example, for the overruling of long-settled precedents
that cannot survive critical reassessment. If so, the best solution
to the current impasse is to confer unlimited ideological leeway
upon the one person authorized to make federal judicial nomina-
tions-the president. For such a solution to take hold, however, a
deal must be struck: senators of the party that does not control
the White House must accede to the most ideological of nominees,
while senators on the other side of the aisle must do the same if
POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al (describing the Administration's plans to resubmit the majority
of the judicial nominations previously blocked by Senate Democrats).
30. The study in question, by Professors Carp, Manning, and Stidham, measures the
voting record of George W. Bush's first-term district court appointees against that of other
judicial cohorts in the areas of civil rights and liberties, criminal justice, and labor and
economic regulation. The authors find that the current Administration's appointees have
compiled a more conservative voting record in civil rights cases than those of any other
administration, Democratic or Republican, in the last forty years. The overall conserva-
tism of the current Bush cohort is offset by a more moderate stance in the areas of crimi-
nal justice, labor, and economic regulation, but nevertheless ranks a very close second to
that of the Reagan cohort. See Robert A. Carp et al., The Decision-Making Behavior of
George W. Bush's Judicial Appointees: Far-Right, Conservative, or Moderate?, 88
JUDICATURE 20, 26 & tbl.1 (2004).
31. See, e.g., Maltese, supra note 3, at 13-14, 24-27; Fletcher & Dewar, supra note 29,
at Al (quoting Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid's position that Senate Democrats have
rejected "only 10 of the most extreme" judicial nominees).
32. The idea that presidents must occasionally compromise in their choice of judicial
nominees is, of course, not a new one. The fault for that idea lies not with today's dimin-
ished band of Democratic senators, but with the Framers, for arriving at a constitutional
design that places the Senate in the way of the presidential appointment power. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 28 (2000) (discussing how
the Appointments Clause reflected a compromise between those who favored a strong cen-
tral government, and others who feared the concentration of executive power).
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and when their party loses control of the White House. Such a
deal, we will argue, is easier said than enforced.
If we think, on the other hand, that open ideological conflict on
the bench is a bad thing, then two possible solutions suggest
themselves. First, we might simply institutionalize the practical
consequences of the filibuster and embrace as completely legiti-
mate the proposition that it not only does, but should, require the
support of at least sixty senators in order for someone to gain a
lifetime appointment to the federal judiciary.3 To be sure, this so-
lution is not perfect, in that it cannot absolutely guarantee the
appointment of only centrists. It is conceivable that one party
could capture a filibuster-proof majority of sixty Senate seats
along with the White House. If so, one could expect a rather
skewed slate of judicial appointees. But, in the more likely sce-
nario where the Senate is at least somewhat closely divided be-
tween the two parties, one would expect the sixty-vote filibuster
hurdle to restrain the selection of extremists. Alternatively, even
in the highly unusual event that one party were to win a filibus-
ter-proof majority-an occurrence not witnessed since the after-
math of Watergate34-one might well ask whether the political
center had not itself shifted.
The second and seemingly obvious solution-namely, that
presidents should simply stop nominating ideological extrem-
ists-is no solution at all. More precisely, it is nowhere near a co-
gent response if one recognizes that presidents have political
goals and the wit to realize that having friendly men and women
on the federal bench is conducive, if not necessary, to realizing
those goals. Indeed, one suspects that relatively few of the Presi-
dent's partisan opponents-that is, the senators from the oppos-
ing political party-would themselves genuinely wish that a
president of their own party would appoint a string of "centrists."
33. Compare John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Les-
sons from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1702 (2004) (describing European supermajority
requirements for appointment to national constitutional courts, and suggesting that simi-
lar practices might be desirable in the United States), with John 0. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing against the adoption of an express supermajority rule for
the confirmation of lower federal court judges, in part because "there is a positive benefit
to diversity in jurisprudential approaches that a lower federal judiciary installed by major-
ity rule would likely provide"), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=572408 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
34. See ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 56-58 tbls.1-19.
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One of the rewards, after all, of winning control of both the White
House and Senate is that, with luck, one will be able to complete
what Jack Balkin has labeled the "constitutional trifecta" of con-
trol over all three branches of the federal government.
This immediately suggests that one might not be able to rely on
the same kind of "self-interest" underlying arms control. It is far
easier to imagine that leaders of both the United States and Rus-
sia might agree that both countries would genuinely benefit from
reducing the level of armaments than to believe that leaders of
the two political parties will agree that they are both best served
by maximizing the number of "centrists" on the bench. More pre-
cisely, the appointment of centrist judges may be desirable to the
parties, but only as a second-best option when the first-best op-
tion of appointing ideological helpmates is unavailable.36 Perhaps
the country would best be served by centrists, but that is a far dif-
ferent conclusion from one that the political parties and their
most active supporters would benefit. (If one is a fan of James
Madison, one might recall his early distrust of political parties as
mere "factions," committed to their own rather than the "public"
interest.")
We assume, then, however sweet and reasonable their rhetoric
may be, that presidents prefer to appoint ideologically sympa-
thetic judges over "centrist" judges who are only marginally iden-
tified with the positions of one party or the other. And, of course,
it is (only) the suspected ideologues who are the recipients of ex-
traordinary Senate attention. There is, for example, no reason
whatsoever to believe that contemporary Democrats are resistant
to the idea that George W. Bush be able to appoint any judges at
all, or that Republicans were eager to deprive Bill Clinton of the
ability to appoint even one judge. Other contributions to this
Symposium give the specific numbers (and percentages) of nomi-
nees who are confirmed, 3 but surely it is clear that the target of
35. Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407, 1455 (2001); see also Lucas A. Powe & H.W. Perry, The Political Battle for
the Constitution, 22 CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 2005).
36. Even the desirability of centrist judges as a second-best option is open to question:
for example, Republicans might plausibly prefer a half-empty bench of conservatives to a
full bench of centrists.
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 60-61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
38. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the
Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 904-08 (2005).
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Democratic filibusters have either advertised unusually conserva-
tive positions or been suspected of deliberately hiding such posi-
tions from view.39 That some nominees have appeared aimed for
higher judicial office-by dint of race or gender or both-has
hardly whetted Democratic enthusiasm for them. Similarly, Re-
publicans, who confirmed most of Clinton's nominees, reserved
their primary fire for those they viewed as strongly liberal or "un-
sound" on one or another issue that was highly salient, such as
the death penalty.4" So the issue is really whether Democratic
and Republican presidents will be given significant freedom to
appoint judges strongly identified with particular issues that dis-
tinguish the two parties (such as abortion, federalism, the legal
rights of the poor, and so on).
If one believes that presidents should have such freedom-
perhaps because one thinks, quite plausibly, that it is good for the
country to have a politically diverse federal judiciary that in-
cludes a suitable number of distinctly non-centrist "mavericks"--
then it would obviously be desirable if those exercising the power
of confirmation, i.e., members of the United States Senate, could
enter into an agreement, in effect, to allow presidents such free-
dom, secure in the knowledge that, over time, the arrangement
will benefit Democrats and Republicans alike, if not also the
country at large. But how in the world would one establish (and
maintain) such an agreement at the present time?
IV. WHY THE CONFLICT OVER JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS MAKES
NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION LOOK EASY
Let us return to our simple (but, we hope, plausible) model of
arms reduction. We begin with a model of two leaders (call them
presidents, prime ministers, dictators, whatever) who both agree
that something needs to be done (i.e., reduce the dangerous level
of arms). These leaders exercise effective management over the
relevant political institutions needed to ratify and implement any
such agreement. This is no minor assumption. The difficulty of
obtaining legislative or popular approval introduces several lay-
39. See Maltese, supra note 3, at 22-24.
40. Id. at 16.
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ers of uncertainty that affect both the substance and likelihood of
any agreement.4'
For example, suppose that a dictator-a strong leader who can
ratify and implement agreements without the cooperation of
other political actors-seeks an agreement with a president who
must seek ex post legislative approval. The dictator does not
know whether the president will be able to obtain approval for
any given agreement; indeed, the dictator does not even know if
the president knows. In the course of negotiating an agreement,
both sides will be required to make perhaps onerous concessions.
The fact that the president must seek approval, however, means
not only that the dictator's concessions will be made public, but
also that the disclosure will be for naught if the agreement is re-
jected. The result will be the destruction of the dictator's subse-
quent bargaining position, if not also personal humiliation. These
considerations may reduce the dictator's willingness to make con-
cessions in the first place. Moreover, even if the president does
know what the legislature will approve, he will have an incentive
to deceive the dictator as to the legislature's willingness to ratify,
so long as he is more hawkish than the legislature and stands to
gain a negotiating advantage by blaming the legislature for his
own recalcitrance. The dictator knows, of course, that the presi-
dent may be bluffing; what the dictator does not know, however,
is whether the president is bluffing. These considerations may
induce the dictator to hold out for concessions that the president
cannot in fact give. It is precisely for such reasons that it may be
easier for dictators or despots to negotiate agreements with one
another than with, say, presidents in an American-style separa-
tion-of-powers system who must look to an independent legisla-
41. See Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, Democratic Politics and International
Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberali-
zation, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 118, 131 (1997) (observing that the executive's inability
to anticipate the legislature's preferences creates uncertainty that makes agreement diffi-
cult). The Schelling conjecture, named for Thomas Schelling's 1960 book The Strategy of
Conflict, suggests that a domestic political requirement of legislative ratification actually
strengthens a country's bargaining position: "The need for the hawkish legislature to rat-
ify the agreement means that its hawkishness can be used by the executive to extract an
offer it might not have gotten otherwise." Id. at 131. Milner and Rosendorff proceed to
demonstrate, however, that if the divide between the executive and the legislature is too
great, the uncertainty that results frustrates the very possibility of agreement. See id. at
118, 131
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ture for supermajority approval of their agreements with foreign
leaders. 2
For agreement to be reached in the first place, then, it helps if
the leaders in question are strong ones empowered to make bind-
ing agreements that will in fact be implemented. And for pur-
poses of enforcement, it helps if the agreement will be carried out
during the term-of-office of the leaders in question, who will,
among other things, have publicly committed all of their prestige
to the agreement, including, of course, its most controversial fea-
tures. Finally, these leaders will need the political (and personal)
strength to discipline anyone who proves resistant to implemen-
tation of the agreement following formal ratification.
Let us return now to the issue of judicial appointments and the
(stipulated) desire to decrease the level of partisan warfare that
operates to deny presidents the ability to appoint the kinds of
judges most preferred by their respective political parties. We
might begin by asking who is empowered to negotiate a deal by
which, for example, Republicans would accept the appointment of
strong liberals (e.g., Laurence Tribe) and Democrats in turn
would acquiesce in the appointment of strong conservatives (e.g.,
Robert Bork). Is there an analogue to the presidents, prime min-
isters, and similar officials who ultimately give their imprimatur
to grand arms control treaties? It is hard to think of any.
The most likely candidates, of course, are the Senate majority
and minority leaders, now Senators Frist from Tennessee and
Reid from Nevada. (One might also plausibly suggest the chair
and ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, though it makes no difference for present purposes.) Let us
assume that they actually agree that the current level of partisan
bickering in the Senate must be defused, and that the way to do
so is for each party to accept any nominee of an opposing-party
president-subject, presumably, to minimal and relatively objec-
tive criteria of professional competence. That is, as in our arms
control example, we assume away the problem of bargaining and
skip directly to the problem of enforcement. 3
42. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate to ratify
any treaty).
43. This is not to imply that the bargaining problem is trivial. On the contrary, it is
acute. Why, for example, do presidents and senators of the opposite parties not agree upon
a "Missouri compromise" under which conservative and liberal candidates would be paired
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It should go without saying, though we will say it anyway, that
neither Frist nor Reid has the slightest authority (or, perhaps
more to the point, political weight) to commit their respective
party caucuses to such a deal. One might well imagine that Re-
publicans would be delighted to approve it, given the very large
expected (and immediate) gains, while Democrats would be alto-
gether torn. But let us imagine that enough Democrats convince
themselves to the following effect: "It's worth giving up our bar-
gaining power today because I'm sure we can count on the Repub-
licans to keep their word whenever a Democrat is in the White
House."
What would be the immediate consequences of such a deal?
Given the current configuration of power (i.e., a Republican
President and a Republican Senate), Senate Democrats would
have to terminate their filibusters of such nominees as Priscilla
Owen and Janice Roberts Brown and, for that matter, confirm
Bush's recess appointee to the Eleventh Circuit, former Alabama
Attorney General William Pryor." Moreover, as the 2008 presi-
dential election approaches, Republicans would have every incen-
tive to rush through as many appointments as possible in order to
leave extremely few (ideally, no) empty seats to be filled by a po-
tentially Democratic successor.
To use the language of our hypothetical arms control process,
on day one the Republicans will enjoy seeing their opponents en-
gage in the equivalent of destroying far more than merely one
missile. But when, exactly, does day two occur? In the model of
off and moved simultaneously through the nomination and confirmation processes? Such
an arrangement would not be unprecedented: President Clinton adopted Republican Sena-
tor Slade Gorton's choice of Richard Tallman for the Ninth Circuit in exchange for the ap-
pointment of Willie Fletcher to the same court. (Senate Republicans also insisted, success-
fully, that Fletcher's mother, Carter appointee Betty Fletcher, take senior status.) See
Wilson, supra note 9, at 44-45 (describing the two-part deal to "throw mama from the
bench" and replace "mama" with a Republican). The problem is that, even if adoption of a
permanent "Missouri compromise" for judicial appointments is in the long-term interest of
both presidents and senators, each side has an incentive to hold out for a better deal. If
each side believes that it can extract a better deal from the other side, and is prepared to
wait for that deal, agreement may never occur. It should also be obvious that this type of
deal is more viable for "inferior" courts, which usually have enough openings to allow for
the simultaneous appointment of multiple judges, than for the Supreme Court, where
there is usually only one vacancy at a time (if any).
44. The controversy surrounding another recess appointment, that of District Judge
Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit, was mooted shortly after the 2004 elections by
Judge Pickering's decision to retire from the bench. See Adam Liptak, Judge Appointed by
Bush After Impasse in Senate Retires, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A22.
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arms reduction outlined above, one could seriously envision the
day-by-day (or even month-by-month) reciprocity that would pro-
vide needed verification of each party's good faith (and, in the
process, make the world safer). Is anything similar possible with
regard to our distinctly hypothetical Frist-Reid agreement?
By definition, day two cannot occur until (and unless) the na-
tion (or, at least, the Electoral College) elects a Democrat who
wishes to nominate liberals to counterbalance the presumed con-
servatives installed by a Republican president, with the acquies-
cence of the Democrats, on day one. Note, however, that it is not
enough to elect a Democratic president to bring about day two.
There must also exist some significant number of judicial vacan-
cies (or the political clout necessary to create vacancies by ex-
panding the federal judiciary). If, predictably, Republicans rush
the confirmation of judicial nominees and thus minimize the
number of vacant seats, it could take some years for a Democratic
president genuinely to counterbalance the Republican nomina-
tions. The bench-packing we might expect from an outgoing Re-
publican administration would only be exacerbated by the statis-
tically demonstrable tendency of federal judges to time their
retirements strategically, so as to facilitate their replacement by
presidents of their own party. 5 Even on a purely anecdotal basis,
this tendency is already obvious with regard to the Supreme
Court, and there is no reason for "inferior" judges to behave much
differently. There is, then, likely to be a considerable gap between
days one and two in the judicial appointment process. In the
meantime, Republicans would enjoy the considerable benefits of
Democratic acquiescence.
But let us assume that there is a Democratic president in the
White House and, in addition, that there exists a sufficient num-
ber of vacancies for control of given circuits to change from Re-
publican to Democratic hands. Would one necessarily trust Sen-
ate Republicans to forego the use of their powers if and when a
Democrat nominates as judges men and women who are clearly
unsympathetic to key aspects of the Republican Party's agenda?
Perhaps Senator Frist and other Republican leaders who publicly
45. For statistically significant evidence that federal judges do in fact time their re-
tirements strategically to coincide with control of the White House by their own party, see
Deborah J. Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of Turnover in the Lower Fed-
eral Courts, 1900-1987, 52 J. POL. 457, 464, 466-72 (1990).
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endorsed the deal would have a reputational interest in demon-
strating a willingness to keep their word, even against severe op-
position from a political base that is enraged by Democratic ap-
pointments. But one can as easily imagine that a Republican
leader in Senator Frist's position might renege upon (or "reinter-
pret") any such deal because he possesses White House ambitions
of his own:46 A Republican leader who hopes to win the support of
highly partisan primary voters in the not-too-distant future
might well find it a better investment of his own political capital
to renege on the deal than to acquiesce in any "liberalization" of
the judiciary. After all, what cost would he pay for reneging? It is
pointless to say that angry Democrats would refuse to elect him
President; they're not going to do that anyway. Republicans, how-
ever, might be delighted to support someone who proved so
skilled at snookering the Democrats and getting a bunch of con-
servative Republicans on the bench. And even if Democrats could
figure out a way to make life difficult for him in the Senate, he
might well leave that institution, as Bob Dole did, in order to de-
vote all of his time to campaigning for the presidency. To be fancy
about it, the likelihood of Frist's departure from the Senate un-
dermines the deterrent effect of retaliation over repeat play.
Reagan's maxim--"Trust, but verify"-is memorable because it
expresses a profound truth: "trust" alone, unaccompanied by any
plausible incentive structure, is inadequate to generate or sustain
significant political change. As devotees of what has come to be
called the "new institutionalism" would point out, it is crucial to
design institutional structures that generate the proper incen-
tives with regard to achieving the desired public policy. This "new
institutionalism" is heavily influenced by so-called "rational
choice" theory, itself heavily influenced by economic models of
egoistic actors who are motivated-indeed, perhaps exclusively-
by a desire to maximize their own self-interests.4" It is foolhardy
to "trust" them to be altruistic; instead, to dress Madison's fa-
mous argument in Federalist No. 51 in modern clothing, one must
46. See, e.g., Charles Babington & Helen Dewar, Senator Frist's Political Rise Slows
in Pace, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2004, at Al (describing Senator Frist's presidential ambi-
tions).
47. See, e.g., William H. Riker, Political Science and Rational Choice, in
PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 163, 172-81 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A.
Shepsle eds., 1990) (setting forth the premises of the "rational choice" approach).
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harness the self-interested ambition of individuals to institution-
ally created incentives in ways that will serve the public inter-
est.
48
We have already seen that Republicans will be greatly tempted
to renege on any agreement, once they have reaped its short-term
benefits and the time comes for them to begin paying its costs.
One of the few things that might lead them nevertheless to honor
the agreement is the very personal interest that senators have in
preserving their own reputations, and in avoiding retaliation for
promises broken. But how effective is this incentive likely to be,
given that no Democratic president will be arriving in Washing-
ton until 2009 at the very earliest? The longer the wait for a De-
mocratic president-that is, "day two," in the language of our
arms control analogy-the less reason there is to believe that the
negotiators (and guarantors) of the agreement, even if we assume
they are (or were) completely "trustworthy," will still be around.
And it is altogether thinkable that their successors would be more
recently elected partisan senators who see strong personal and
party advantages in sinking the president's choices. The more
that presidents and senators come and go, the harder it becomes
for any deal between Republicans and Democrats to endure.
Reneging on commitments is a time-honored tradition in
American politics. Consider in this context George W. Bush's re-
pudiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the former So-
viet Union 49 or his withdrawal of the United States signature on
the international treaty establishing the International Criminal
Court (though, of course, it had not been ratified by the Senate).50
Indeed, one can go much further back in American history. One of
the most notorious cases in American constitutional law is the
Chinese Exclusion Case,51 in which Congress simply reneged on
the promise the United States had made in a treaty with China
with regard to immigration.52 The Supreme Court unanimously
upheld this act of faithlessness on the principle that one Congress
48. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
49. See Dana Milbank, U.S. Withdraws From Missile Treaty: Bush Presses Congress
for $7.8 Billion for Defense System, WASH. POST, June 14, 2002, at A28.
50. See Glenn Kessler, Concerns over War Crimes Court Not New: U.S. Accused of For-
going Chance to Seek Changes to Ease Clinton-Era Worries, WASH. POST, July 2, 2002, at
A9.
51. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
52. See id. at 589.
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cannot bind a successor, and that later legislation, so long as it
does not violate some independent constitutional ground, can al-
ways repeal earlier legislation, including treaties.53
Given the seemingly unlimited ability of our government to re-
nege upon its agreements, it is an interesting question why coun-
tries enter into treaties with the United States at all, but the sub-
ject lies well beyond the scope of this brief article.54 The present
question is why serious politicians-knowing perfectly well their
own tendency to renege when it is in their best interest to do so-
would ever sacrifice their own real interests at time t by allowing
the appointment of ideological adversaries to influential lifetime
judgeships, in reliance on a promise that (unnamed and un-
known) politicians will do the same at time t+x, where x is an un-
known and possibly substantial number. That is, compliance with
the hypothetical Frist-Reid deal means at least four years of im-
mediate and real Republican gains, in exchange for a promise
that a potentially different group of Republicans will return the
favor at some undetermined point down the road. Why would any
rational Democrat agree to, much less comply with, such an ar-
rangement?
V. CONCLUSION
When it comes to the appointment of federal judges, good news
and bad news are in the eye of the beholder. If one likes the idea
of a more centrist judiciary, then one ought to regard it as good
news that it is unlikely that presidents will, in fact, be allowed to
place highly ideological figures on the federal judiciary, at least so
long as the opposition party in the Senate can rally forty-one
votes to sustain a filibuster. To be sure, presidents may continue
to nominate ideologues, in part to shore up political support from
their bases, even as they expect these nominees to fail. And even
53. See id. at 600-02.
54. The problem illustrated by the Chinese Exclusion Case-namely, the inability of
one legislature to bind its successor to a treaty or piece of legislation-is not at all peculiar
to the United States. Constitutions often entrench notions of sovereignty that make it dif-
ficult for states to keep their commitments, and courts may not necessarily supply the
needed enforcement. For example, British courts observe a strong version of parliamen-
tary sovereignty that makes it impossible for Parliament to prevent itself from inadver-
tently repudiating EU law. See David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 652, 664-65 n.37 (2005).
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extreme nominees may divide the opposition in such a way that
makes opposition costly and confirmation therefore plausible.
There are strategic advantages for Republican presidents, in par-
ticular, to nominate female and ethnic-minority conservatives; re-
cent memory has given us Priscilla Owen, Janice Rogers Brown,
Miguel Estrada and, most spectacularly, Clarence Thomas. Simi-
larly, one might expect a Democratic president to seek out politi-
cal liberals who are also evangelical Christians, though the reali-
ties of contemporary American politics suggest that Democratic
presidents may have greater difficulty playing the kind of demo-
graphic jujitsu at which Republican presidents have demon-
strated such skill. Still, the overall thrust would be toward a
more moderate, "centrist" judiciary should both parties prove
willing to try to block presidential nominees they deem too ideo-
logical.
If, on the other hand, one likes the idea of a decent number of
ideologues or "mavericks" on the bench, the news seems less op-
timistic. Perhaps one can hope for "stealth" ideologues, who will
turn out to be considerably further along the political spectrum
than they appear to be at the time of nomination, but this seems
to be a relatively dubious hope. After all, both parties are increas-
ingly devoting considerable resources to investigating any and all
nominees for the judiciary precisely in order to guard against
such candidates.
Game theorists speak of the "Prisoner's Dilemma," in which
two individuals, whose collective interest is mutual silence, will
nonetheless have a strong incentive to confess their misconduct to
the police because they will individually benefit from doing so.
Indeed, a given prisoner will gain maximal advantage if his com-
patriot in fact does remain silent. Even if one has entered into a
solemn pact with the other to remain silent, each has an individ-
ual interest in reneging on the deal. The general subject of the
Prisoner's Dilemma has generated an extensive literature of its
own.5 Suffice it to say that the only plausible solutions seem to
involve either third-party enforcement or a situation of repeat
play, in which the threat of future retaliation deters treachery-
at least, unless the end of the game comes into sight.5" Third-
55. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION passim (1997);
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION passim (1984).
56. See supra note 28 (discussing backwards induction).
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party enforcement is not really an option when it comes to deal-
ings between nuclear superpowers or political parties. The salu-
tary effects of repeat play are what make plausible the enforce-
ment of the arms control scheme sketched earlier. But, for better
and worse, control of the White House does not alternate with
sufficient frequency for repeat play to work its wonders on politi-
cians who prefer gains today over uncertain gains at some un-
known point in the future. In the meantime, presidents have
every incentive to extend their legacy by appointing as many
ideological allies to lifetime judgeships as possible. And in re-
sponse, opposition senators can be expected to use every means at
their disposal to prevent presidents from doing so. Conflict over
the nomination of ideologues to the federal bench-even to sup-
posedly "inferior" judgeships-is now a feature of the political
landscape, and it is not going away. It is for the reader to decide
whether this reality is cause for celebration or despair.
For those who do relish a dose of conflict in their politics, the
news can only get better. The Republican leadership has threat-
ened, with increasing frequency and vigor, that it will make use
of obscure parliamentary tactics to abolish the filibuster, at least
with regard to judicial nominations-a course of action known,
appropriately enough, as the "nuclear option."57 The likelihood
and consequences of going nuclear must await another day for
full exploration. For now, though, two observations are in order.
First, the nuclear option has become more than a remote possi-
bility. To be sure, a handful of moderate Republicans have ex-
pressed opposition to the idea, and their views may prove deci-
57. Helen Dewar & Mike Allen, GOP May Target Use of Filibuster, WASH. POST, Dec.
13, 2004, at Al; Alexander Bolton, Frist Finger on 'Nuclear' Button, THE HILL (Washing-
ton, D.C.), May 13, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.hillnews.com/news/051304/frist.
aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). Abolition of the filibuster is itself subject to filibuster, but
there exist a number of procedural tactics by which the Republican majority could circum-
vent Democratic resistance. See id. The underlying strategy is that a Republican senator
would raise a point of order that the consideration of judicial nominees may not be filibus-
tered, and the chair-most likely Vice President Cheney, in his capacity as President of
the Senate-would sustain the point of order. Id. A simple majority vote would then suf-
fice to win any appeal of the chair's ruling, or to table any objections to the ruling. See id.
Such filibuster-busting tactics were first perfected over a century ago by the Republican
leadership in the House of Representatives. See Walter J. Oleszek, A Pre-Twentieth Cen-
tury Look at the House Committee on Rules, Congressional Research Service (Dec. 1998),
available at http://www.house.gov/rules/pre 20th.rules.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005)
(discussing the successful efforts of Thomas Reed, first as a member of the Rules Commit-
tee then as Speaker, to defeat a variety of Democratic filibusters).
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sive. 8 Nevertheless, the strengthening of the GOP's Senate ma-
jority, and particularly of its conservative wing, following the
2004 elections renders the threat increasingly plausible. More-
over, the very fact that the Republican leadership has publicly
and repeatedly threatened to go nuclear creates pressure to carry
out the threat, for the same reasons that make it harder for a na-
tion to avoid war once it has already massed troops on the en-
emy's border and demanded the equivalent of unconditional sur-
render. A certain amount of credibility is now at stake, which
makes backing down costly (though not as costly, perhaps, as
pressing forward).
Second, Senate Democrats possess nuclear options of their own.
Even if they lose the battle over judicial appointments, they can
wage an expanded war on other fronts. The incoming Senate Mi-
nority Leader has already vowed, in his own words, to make the
GOP "rue the day" that it tampers with the filibuster, and to
"screw things up" throughout the Senate in retaliation. 9 If Sena-
tor Reid makes good on his word, Republican senators may find
themselves in a Never-Never Land of unending quorum calls,6 °
refusal to consent to limits upon debate or amendment, extended
debate on whether bills should be debated at all,61 inexhaustible
streams of non-germane amendments,62 committee paralysis,63
and whatever other parliamentary mayhem the party of Robert
Byrd can muster. In policy terms, Democratic retaliation would
58. See Charles Babington, GOP Moderates Wary of Filibuster Curb, WASH. POST, Jan.
16, 2005, at A5.
59. Dewar & Allen, supra note 57, at Al (quoting Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid)
("If they, for whatever reason, decide to do this,... they will rue the day they did it, be-
cause we will do whatever we can do to strike back[.] I know procedures around here. And
I know that there will still be Senate business conducted. But I will, for lack of a better
word, screw things up.").
60. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc.
No. 106-15, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., R. VI, cl. 3, at 4 (2000), available at
http://rules.senate.gov/senate rules/rule22.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) ("If, at any time
during the daily sessions of the Senate, a question shall be raised by any Senator as to the
presence of a quorum, the Presiding Officer shall forthwith direct the Secretary to call the
roll and shall announce the result[.]").
61. The standing rules of the Senate do not purport to limit the time that may be
spent on debate. See id. R. XIX, at 13-14. For this reason, the Senate is heavily reliant in
practice upon the use of unanimous consent agreements that contain time restrictions.
62. The Standing Rules privilege only appropriations bills from non-germane amend-
ments. See id. R. XVI, cl. 4, at 11.
63. See id. R. XXVI, cl. 5(a), at 30 (prohibiting committee and subcommittee meetings
while the Senate is in session, absent the consent of both the majority and minority lead-
ers).
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likely jeopardize major components of the President's legislative
agenda, including Social Security and tax reform.64
Under what conditions, then, might the GOP nevertheless de-
cide to go nuclear? The nuclear option becomes a perfectly ra-
tional course of action for Senate Republicans if they believe that
the value of untrammeled bench-packing today outweighs both
the immediate costs to be inflicted by minority retaliation, and
the future loss of their own ability to filibuster odious nominees if
and when they find themselves in the minority. It is possible that
they do hold these beliefs. Some Republicans may well believe
that fear of electoral consequences will deter the remaining De-
mocrats from resisting or retaliating in any meaningful way.65
And in the immediate aftermath of the 2004 elections, the pros-
pect of Democratic control over both the White House and Senate
may strike some Republicans as too remote to give them pause.
Whether these beliefs are justified is a different matter. It is
questionable whether Senate Democrats will in fact construe
President Bush's wartime re-election or even the defeat of their
former leader, Tom Daschle-a Democrat from a Republican
state-as any indication of broad popular support for the ap-
pointment of conservative federal judges. It is also unclear why
Republicans should view the Democratic electoral "base" as any
less ideologically driven, especially these days, than is the Repub-
lican "base." Democratic and Republican senators alike must
64. See Dewar & Allen, supra note 57, at Al (quoting Democratic Senator Charles
Schumer) ("Social Security and tax reform need Democratic support. If [Republicans] use
the nuclear option, in all likelihood they would not get Democratic support.").
65. Senator Cornyn's views are illustrative:
I hope [President Bush's judicial nominees] receive better treatment than
they did in the last Congress[.] We experienced unprecedented filibusters of
the president's judicial nominees, which I believe the voters repudiated on
Nov. 2, both by returning the president with a decisive victory and defeating
the chief obstructionist in the Senate, that was the minority leader .... Those
Democratic senators up for re-election in states Bush did very well in have to
be looking at what happened to Tom Daschle in South Dakota and wondering
if the same fate is in store for them if they continue to obstruct and prevent
up or down votes on the president's nominees.
Deb Riechmann, Bush to Renominate 20 for Judgeships, YAHOO! NEWS, Dec. 23, 2004, at
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=536&e=3&u=/ap/20041224/ap-on-go-p
r wh/bush federal-judges (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (quoting Republican Senator and
Judiciary Committee member John Cornyn); see also, e.g., Fletcher & Dewar, supra note
29, at Al (quoting Senator Cornyn) ("I think the American people sent a strong message
on Nov. 2 against the obstructionist tactics that, unfortunately, we saw all too often in the
past four years.").
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demonstrate the requisite degree of ideological commitment and
partisan fervor if they are to stave off vigorous primary chal-
lenges from within their own parties.
Meanwhile, at least some GOP senators can be expected to balk
at the nuclear option, not simply because they prefer comity to
conflict,66 but also because they grasp that political fortunes are
bound eventually to reverse, at which time abolition of the filibus-
ter will become cause for regret. To fear the future in this way,
however, requires both a degree of foresight and a sense of lon-
gevity-that is, a sense that one will survive long enough to reap
the consequences of one's own actions. Neither quality happens to
be universal.
66. See, e.g., Babington, supra note 58, at A5 (quoting Republican Senator Olympia
Snowe) ("I just don't see how it's going to benefit us, even in the majority.., because ulti-
mately it could create more wedges and political wounds.").
67. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 4, at A13 (quoting Republican Senator John McCain)
("I worry about doing away with the rights of the minority in the Senate[.] If I believed the
Republicans would be in the majority forever, I'd be far more favorably disposed."); see also
Babington, supra note 58, at A5 (reporting Republican Senator Chuck Hagel's doubts as to
the wisdom of the nuclear option, in light of past experience with Democratic control of the
Senate).

